We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, that has other related applications. Our model differs from traditional position auctions in that we consider buyers whose demand might be multiple consecutive slots, which is motivated by modeling buyers who may require these to display a large size ad. We study three major pricing mechanisms, the Bayesian pricing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and an envy-free solution model. Under the Bayesian model, we design a polynomial-time computable truthful mechanism that optimizes the revenue. For the market equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial-time algorithm to obtain the maximum revenue market equilibrium solution. In the envy-free setting, an optimal solution is presented for the case where the buyers have the same demand for the number of consecutive slots. We present results of a simulation that compares the revenues from the above schemes.
Introduction
Ever since the pioneering studies on pricing protocols for sponsored search advertisement, especially with the generalized second price auction (GSP), by Edelman et al. [15] , as well as Varian [41] , market making mechanisms have attracted much attention from the research community in understanding their effectiveness for the revenue maximization task facing platforms providing Internet advertisement services. In the traditional advertisement setting, advertisers negotiate ad presentations and prices with website publishers directly. An automated pricing mechanism simplifies this process by creating a bidding game for the buyers of advertisement space over an IT platform. It creates a complete competition environment for the price discovery process. Accompanying the explosion of the online advertisement business, there is a need for a complete picture of the pricing methods that may be used by advertisers and ad space providers.
In addition to search advertisements, display advertisements have been widely used in commercial webpages. They have a rich format of displays such as text ads and rich media ads. Compared with sponsored search, there is a lack of systematic studies of the associated mechanism design issues. The market maker faces a combinatorial problem of whether to assign a large space to one large rich media ad or multiple small text ads, as well as how to decide on the prices charged for them. We present a study of the allocation and pricing mechanisms for displaying slots in this environment where some buyers would like to have one slot and others may want several consecutive slots in a display panel. In addition to webpage ads, another motivation for our study is TV advertising where inventories of a commercial break are usually divided into slots of a few seconds each, and slots have various qualities measuring their expected number of viewers and the corresponding attractiveness. However, current auction mechanisms might perform poorly under these additional constraints that only consecutive slots can be assigned to any one buyer. For example, GSP auctions cannot be applied to this setting where buyers may have different demand sets. Another example, when applying the famous VCG auctions to this setting, the extracted revenue is relatively low.
We discuss three types of mechanisms and consider the revenue maximization problem under these mechanisms, and compare their effectiveness in revenue maximization under a dynamic setting where buyers may change their bids to improve their utilities. Our results make an important step towards understanding the advantages and disadvantages of their uses in practice. Assume the ad supplier divides the ad space into small enough slots (pieces) such that each advertiser is interested in a position with a fixed number of consecutive pieces. In modeling values to the advertisers, we modify the position auction model from the sponsored search market [15, 41] where each ad slot is measured by the Click Through Rates (CTR), with users' interest expressed by a click on an ad. Since display advertising is usually sold on a per impression (CPM) basis instead of a per click basis (CTR), the quality factor of an ad slot stands for the expected impression it brings per unit of time. Unlike in the traditional position auctions, people may have varying demands (need different spaces to display their ads) in a rich media ad auction for the market maker to decide on slot allocations and their prices. It should be mentioned that in real markets, bidders might have alternative advertising approaches which are external to the mechanism designer. This competition scenario has been studied in some restricted auction settings [11, 33] but few results are obtained for advertising auctions. Therefore, we follow the traditional position auction models and assume that the buyers have no alternatives in the market, i.e. the auctioneer is a monopolist.
Our modeling approach
We have a set of buyers (advertisers) and a set of items to be sold (the ad slots on a web page). We address the challenge of computing prices that satisfy certain desirable properties. Next we describe the elements of the model in more detail.
Items Our model considers the geometric organization of ad slots, which commonly has the slots arranged in some sequence (typically, from top to bottom in the right-hand side of a web page). The slots are of variable quality. In the study of sponsored search auctions, a standard assumption is that the quality (corresponding to click-through rate) is higher at the beginning of the sequence and then monotonically decreases. Here we consider a generalization where the quality may go down and up, subject to a limit on the total number of local maxima (which we call peaks), corresponding to focal points on the web page. As we will show later, without this limit the revenue maximization problem is NP-hard.
Buyers A buyer (advertiser) may want to purchase multiple slots, so as to display a larger ad. Such slots should be consecutive in the sequence. Each buyer i has a fixed demand d i , the number of slots she needs for her ad. Two important aspects of this are -sharp multi-unit demand, that is, buyer i should be allocated d i items, or none at all;
there is no point in allocating any fewer -consecutiveness of the allocated items, in the pre-existing sequence of items.
These constraints give rise to a new and interesting combinatorial pricing problem.
Valuations We assume that each buyer i has a parameter v i representing the value she assigns to a slot of unit quality. Valuations for multiple slots are additive, so that a buyer with demand d i would value a block of d i slots to be their total quality, multiplied by v i . This is an extension of the valuation model considered by Edelman et al. [15] and Varian [41] in their seminal work for keywords advertising where the buyers are unit-demand.
Pricing mechanisms Given the valuations and demands from the buyers, the market maker decides on a price vector for all slots and an allocation of slots to buyers, as an output of the market. The question is one of which output the market maker should choose to achieve certain objectives. We consider three approaches:
-Truthful mechanism whereby the buyers report their demands (publicly known) and values (private) to the market maker; then prices are set so as to ensure that the buyers have no incentive to report incorrect valuations. We give a revenue-maximizing approach (i.e., maximizing the total price paid), within this framework. -Competitive equilibrium whereby we prescribe certain constraints on the prices so as to guarantee certain well-known notions of fairness and envy-freeness. -Envy-free solution whereby we prescribe certain constraints on the prices and allocations so as to achieve envy-freeness, as explained below.
The mechanisms we exhibit are computationally efficient. We also perform experiments to compare the revenues obtained from these three mechanisms.
Related work
Sponsored search advertising via auctions is one of the most popular ways of Internet monetization, which account for a major part of search engines revenue. Consequently, design and analysis of such auctions has drawn a lot of attention in artificial intelligence and electronic commerce. For example, in the pioneering work by Varian [41] and Edelman et al. [15] , the generalized second price (GSP) auctions, used by Google, have been modeled as position auctions having several desirable properties. Variants of this model have been extensively studied from both theoretical and practical points of view [22, 25, 27] . Lahaie [28] analyzed the incentive, efficiency, and revenue properties of ad slot auction designs and also consider first-and second-price payment rules together with each of these allocation rules. Lucier et al. [31] consider the revenue of the GSP auction at equilibrium and prove that if agent values are drawn from identical regular distributions, then the GSP auction paired with an appropriate reserve price generates a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Ashlagi et al. [2] investigated the effect of budget constraints in designing sponsored search auctions. They showed that a modification of the Generalized English Auction introduced by Edelman et al. [15] is envy-free and Pareto optimal (a weaker condition than social welfare maximizing). In artificial intelligence, there has been also considerable research on ad auctions, with a focus on issues like auction design [6] , revenue extraction [25] , bidder strategies [5, 17] , and so on. For a more comprehensive understanding of ad auctions, we refer the reader to recent survey articles (e.g. [32, 37] ).
Auctions play an important role in display advertising market and one challenging problem is to design auctions for online ad exchange platforms. The most relevant work is the literature on designing expressive auctions and clearing algorithms for online advertising [6, 36] . Ghosh et al. [21] provided a framework to model the advertiser's problem of how to fulfill guaranteed contracts and gave a solution where the publisher bids on behalf of its guaranteed contracts in the spot market. Lahaie et al. [29] studied the bidding languages that admits scalable allocation and pricing algorithms in ad exchange markets. They also presented a discussion on the incentive properties of different pricing approaches. Balseiro et al. [3] studied the interactions among budget-constrained bidders in an Ad Exchange by adopting the notion of Fluid Mean Field Equilibrium. For more challenges and direction of display marketing markets, we refer the reader to a recent survey article [26] .
Our consideration of position auctions in the Bayesian setting fits in the general onedimensional auction design framework. Our study considers continuous distributions on buyers' values. For discrete distributions, Cai et al. [8] presents an optimal mechanism for budget constrained buyers without demand constraints in multi-parameter settings and subsequently they also give a general reduction from revenue to welfare maximization in [9] ; for buyers with both budget constraints and demand constraints, 2-approximate mechanisms [1] and 4-approximate mechanisms [4] exist in the literature.
Envy-free auction design for revenue maximization has been extensively studied in algorithmic game theory. Guruswami et al. [24] showed that it is APX-hard to maximize the revenue among envy-free outcomes in matching markets. After that, both positive [12] and negative results [7] have been proven for this problem without budget constraints. For position auctions, Tang and Zhang [40] studied the revenue maximization problems with budget constrained bidders.
There are extensive studies on multi-unit demand in economics, see for example [10, 16] . Chen et al. [13] first considered sharp multi-unit demand, where a buyer with demand d should be allocated d items or none at all, but with no further combinatorial constraint, such as the consecutiveness constraint that we consider here. The sharp demand setting is in contrast with a "relaxed" multi-unit demand (in which one can buy a subset of at most d items), where it is well known that the set of competitive equilibrium prices is non-empty and forms a distributive lattice [23, 39] . This immediately implies the existence of an equilibrium with maximum possible prices, that consequently maximizes the revenue. Demange et al. [14] proposed a combinatorial dynamics which always converges to a revenue maximizing (or minimizing) equilibrium for unit demand; their algorithm can be easily generalized to relaxed multi-unit demand. A strongly related work to our consecutive settings is the work of Rothkopf et al. [38] , where the authors presented a dynamic programming approach to compute the maximum social welfare of consecutive settings when all the qualities are the same. Hence, our dynamic programming approach for general qualities in Bayesian settings is a non-trivial generalization of their setting.
Auction design with consecutive demand buyers studied here can be viewed as a special case of the combinatorial auction design problem (c.f. [35] ) where the buyers have general utility functions over all subsets of the items. Most work in this line of research focused on designing truthful auction to maximizing social welfare in the prior-free setting. Lehmann et al. [30] showed that the social welfare maximization problem with single-minded bidders is NP-hard. Recently, Feldman et al. [19] showed that, in the Bayesian setting, the optimal social welfare can be approximated within a factor of 2 by using posted prices mechanisms. However, in this work we consider the revenue maximization problem when buyers have consecutive demand.
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe the details of our rich media ads model and the related solution concepts. In Sect. 3, we study the problem under the Bayesian model and provide a Bayesian Incentive Compatible auction with optimal expected revenue for the special case of the single peak in quality values of advertisement positions. Then in Sect. 4, we extend the optimal auction to the case with limited peaks/valleys and show that it is NP-hard to maximize revenue without this limit. Next, in Sect. 5, we turn to the full information setting and propose an algorithm to compute the competitive equilibrium with maximum revenue. In Sect. 6, NP-hardness of envy-freeness for consecutive multi-unit demand buyers is shown. We also design a polynomial time solution for the special case where all advertisers demand the same number of ad slots. The simulation is presented in Sect. 7.
Preliminaries
In our model, a rich media advertisement instance consists of n advertisers and m advertising slots. Each slot j ∈ {1, . . . , m} is associated with a (publicly known) number q j which can be viewed as the quality or the desirability of the slot. Each advertiser (or buyer) i wants to display her own ad that occupies d i consecutive slots on the webpage. In addition, each buyer has a private number v i representing her valuation and thus, the i-th buyer's value for item j is v i j = v i q j .
In this paper, we will say that slot j is assigned to a set of buyer B, to denote that j is assigned to some buyer in B. We call the set of all slots assigned to B the allocation to B. In addition, a buyer will be called a winner if he succeeds in displaying his ad and a loser otherwise. We use the standard notation [s] to denote the set of integers from 1 to s, i.e.
[s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. We sometimes use i instead of i∈ [n] to denote the summation over all buyers and j instead of j∈ [m] for items, and the terms E v and E v −i denote, respectively, an expectation over buyer valuation vectors v sampled from the prior, and an expectation over valuation vectors v −i , representing buyers other than i.
The vector v of all the buyers' values is sometimes written as (v i ; v −i ), v i being the i-th entry of v and v −i the joint bids of all buyers other than i. We represent a feasible assignment by a vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), where X i is the set of items allocated to buyer i, i.e. j ∈ X i denotes item j is assigned to buyer i. Thus we have {X i } is pairwise disjoint, which can be viewed as a partition of items. Given a fixed assignment X, we use t i to denote the total quality that buyer i is assigned, precisely, t i = j∈X i q j . In general, when X is a function of buyers' bids v, we define t i to be a function of v such that
When we say that slot qualities have a single peak, we mean that there exists a peak slot k such that for any slot j < k on the left side of k, q j ≥ q j−1 and for any slot j > k on the right side of k, q j ≥ q j+1 .
Bayesian mechanism design
In Sects. 3 and 4, we assume that all buyers' values are distributed independently according to publicly known bounded distributions following the work of [34] . The distribution of each buyer i is represented by a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) F i and a Probability Density Function (PDF) f i . In addition, we assume that the concave and convex closure and integration of those functions can be computed efficiently.
An auction M = (X, p) consists of an allocation function X and a payment function p. More precisely, X specifies the allocation of items to buyers and p = ( p i ) i specifies the buyers' payments, where both X and p are functions of the reported valuations v. Our objective is to maximize the expected revenue of the mechanism Rev(M) = E v i p i (v) by using Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms.
Definition 1 A mechanism M is called Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) iff the following inequalities hold for all
Furthermore, we say M is Incentive Compatible if M satisfies a stronger condition that
To put it in words, in a BIC mechanism, no player can improve her expected utility (expectation taken over other players' bids) by misreporting her value. An IC mechanism satisfies the stronger requirement that no matter what the other players declare, no player has incentives to deviate.
Competitive equilibrium and envy-free solution
In Sect. 5, we study the revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium and envy-free solution in the full information setting instead of the Bayesian setting. An outcome of the market is a pair (X, p), where X specifies an allocation of items to buyers and p specifies prices paid. Given an outcome (X, p),
Definition 2 A tuple (X, p) is a consecutive envy-free pricing solution if every buyer is consecutive envy-free, where a buyer i is consecutive envy-free if the following conditions are satisfied:
for any other subset of consecutive items T with
-if X i = ∅ (i.e., i wins nothing), then, for any subset of consecutive items T with |T | = d i ,
In the literature, there have been two other notions of envy-free allocation, namely, sharp item envy-freeness [13] and bundle envy-freeness [18] . Sharp item envy-free requires that no buyer should envy any bundle of items whose size equals her demand, while bundle envy-free is the (weaker) stipulation that no-one should envy the bundle bought by any other buyer. Note that Definition 2 is about item envy-freeness; a weaker notion of consecutive bundle envy-freeness would require that no buyer should envy a bundle allocated entirely to some other buyer having the same demand.
Example 1 (Three types of envy-freeness) Suppose there are two buyers i 1 and i 2 with perunit-quality v i 1 = 10, v i 2 = 8 and demands
Three items j 1 , j 2 , j 3 have quality q j 1 = q j 3 = 1 and q j 2 = 3. The optimal solution of the three types of envy-freeness are as follows:
-The optimal consecutive envy-free solution,
and p j 2 = 26 with total revenue 38; -Optimal sharp item envy-free solution,
and p j 2 = 28 with total revenue 44; -Optimal (relaxed) bundle envy-free solution,
and p j 2 = 30 with total revenue 46;
Definition 3 (Competitive Equilibrium)
We say an outcome of the market (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium if it satisfies two conditions.
-(X, p) must be consecutive envy-free (Definition 2).
-The unsold items must be priced at zero.
We are interested in the revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium and envy-free solutions. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium always exists for unit demand buyers (even for general v i j valuations) [39] . For our consecutive multi-unit demand model, however, a competitive equilibrium may not always exist as the following example shows.
Example 2 (Competitive equilibrium may not exist) There are two buyers i 1 , i 2 with values v i 1 = 10 and v i 2 = 9, respectively. Let their demands be d i 1 = 1 and d i 2 = 2, respectively. There are two items j 1 , j 2 , both with unit quality q j 1 = q j 2 = 1. If i 1 wins an item, without loss of generality, say j 1 , then j 2 is unsold and p j 2 = 0; by envy-freeness of i 1 , we have p j 1 = 0 as well. Thus, i 2 envies the bundle { j 1 , j 2 }. On the other hand, if i 2 wins both items,
, implying that p j 1 ≤ 9 or p j 2 ≤ 9. Therefore, i 1 is not envy-free. Hence, there is no competitive equilibrium in the given instance.
In the unit demand case, it is well-known that the set of equilibrium prices forms a distributive lattice; hence, there exist extremes which correspond to the maximum and the minimum equilibrium price vectors. In our consecutive demand model, however, even if a competitive equilibrium exists, maximum equilibrium prices may not exist.
Example 3 (Maximum equilibrium need not exist) There are two buyers i 1 , i 2 with values v i 1 = 1, v i 2 = 10 and demands d i 1 = 1, d i 2 = 2, and two items j 1 , j 2 with unit quality q j 1 = q j 2 = 1. It can be seen that allocating the two items to i 2 at prices (19, 1) or (1, 19) are both revenue maximizing equilibria; but there is no equilibrium price vector that is at least both (19, 1) and (1, 19) .
Because of the consecutive multi-unit demand, it is possible that some items are 'overpriced'; this is a significant difference between consecutive multi-unit and unit demand models. Formally, in a solution (X, p), we say an item j is over-priced if there is a buyer i such that j ∈ X i and p j > v i q j . That is, the price charged for item j is larger than its contribution to the utility of its winner.
Example 4 (Over-priced items) There are two buyers i 1 , i 2 with values v i 1 = 20, v i 2 = 10 and demands d i 1 = 1 and d i 2 = 2, and three items j 1 , j 2 , j 3 with qualities q j 1 = 3, q j 2 = 2, q j 3 = 1. We can see that the allocations X i 1 = { j 1 }, X i 2 = { j 2 , j 3 } and prices (45, 25, 5) constitute a revenue maximizing envy-free solution with total revenue 75, where item j 2 is over-priced. If no items are over-priced, the maximum possible prices are (40, 20, 10) with total revenue 70.
Optimal auction for the single peak case
The goal of this section is to present our optimal auction for the single peak case that serves as an elementary component in the general case later. En route, several principal techniques are examined exhaustively to the extent that they can be applied directly in the next section. With these techniques, we show that the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible auction can be represented by a simple Incentive Compatible one. Furthermore, this optimal auction can be implemented efficiently. Given some mechanism, let [34] , we obtain the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1 (From [34]) A mechanism M = (X, p) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible if and only if, letting v i be a lower bound on values taken by
We assume φ i (·) is monotone increasing, i.e. the distribution is regular. If not, Myerson's ironing technique can be applied to make φ i (·) monotone -it is here that we invoke our assumption that we can efficiently compute the convex closure of a continuous function and integration. Lemma 3 follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Lemma 3 Suppose that X is the allocation function that maximizes
Then (X, p) represents an optimal mechanism for the consecutive multiple-slot ad auction problem. Fig. 1 By reassigning i the slots from j, we make the set of assigned slots consecutive
We will use dynamic programming to maximize the virtual surplus in Lemma 2. First we show the following useful lemma which states that all the allocated slots are consecutive (see Fig. 1 ).
Lemma 4 Suppose that ad slot qualities have the single-peak property. There exists an optimal allocation X that maximizes i φ i (v i )t i (v), having the following property. For any unassigned slot j, it must be that either
Proof Let X be an allocation maximising the sum of the virtual values. If X does not satisfy the property in the statement of the lemma, we show how to modify X so as to satisfy the property while preserving optimality. Let j be a slot that violates the property, in that there are allocated slots to either side of j. Letting k be a maximum-quality slot, assume j ≥ k (where the case j ≤ k is similar). Modify X by taking all buyers allocated slots to the right of j, and moving their allocation one position to the left. The sum of virtual valuations cannot decrease, since any buyer's allocation is to slots having at least as high quality. Also, the modification reduces the number of slots violating the condition, so if applied repeatedly, we end up with an optimal allocation having the claimed property.
By renumbering the bidders in the order of the virtual values, we can assume all the buyers are sorted in a non-increasing order according to their virtual values. Next, we prove that the consecutiveness of allocated slots holds for any buyers sets Proof The idea is to pick an arbitrary optimal allocation X and modify it to the desired one. Suppose X does not satisfy the property on a subset [s] . By Lemma 4, there is no unassigned slots in the middle of allocations to set [s] . Then there must be a slot assigned to a buyer i not in the set [s] that separates the allocations to [s]. We use W i to denote the allocated slots of buyer i. Suppose slot k is the peak. There are two cases to be considered: ∈ W i . Let j and j be the leftmost and rightmost slot in W i respectively. We consider two cases q j ≥ q j and q j < q j . We only prove for the first case and the proof for the other case is symmetric. If q j ≥ q j , we find the leftmost slot j 1 > j assigned to [s] and the rightmost slot j 2 < j 1 not assigned to [s]. In addition, let i 1 ∈ [s] be the buyer that j 1 is assigned to and i 2 > s be the buyer that j 2 is assigned to. In single peak case, it is easy to check q j ≥ q j implies that all the slots assigned to i 2 have higher quality than i 1 's. Thus swapping the positions of i 1 and i 2 will always increase the virtual surplus, Fig. 2 . By continuing to do this, we can eliminate all slots not allocated to 
} denote the allocated slots of buyer a and b respectively, where j a 1 are the indices of slots with the largest qualities in W a and W b respectively). We will show that either swapping winning slots of i with a or with b will increase the virtual surplus. To prove this, there four cases needed to be considered: (1) . u i ≥ u a and u i ≥ u b ; (2). u i ≥ u a and u i < u b ; (3). u i < u a and u i ≥ u b ; (4). u i < u a and u i < u b . We only prove the case (1) since the other cases can be proved similarly. Now, suppose u i ≥ u a and u i ≥ u b , then we must have either (i). since φ a (v a ) ≥ φ i (v i ) 
Our summary statement is as follows.
Theorem 1 The mechanism that applies the allocation rule according to Dynamic Programming (3) and payment rule according to Eq. (2) is an optimal mechanism for the banner advertisement problem with single peak qualities. Proof To complete the proof, it suffices to prove that T i (v i ) is monotone non-decreasing. More specifically, we prove a stronger fact, that t i (v i , v −i ) is non-decreasing as v i increases. Given other buyers' bids v −i , the monotonicity of t i is equivalent to t i (v
and we are done.
Consider the case that φ i (v i ) < φ i (v i ). Let Q and Q denote the total quantities obtained by all the other buyers except buyer i in the mechanism when buyer i bids v i and v i respectively.
The above inequalities are due to the optimality of allocations when i bids v i and v i respectively. It follows that
Multiple peaks case
Suppose now that there are only h peaks (local maxima) in the qualities. Thus, there are at most h − 1 valleys (local minima). Since h is a constant, we can enumerate all the buyers occupying the valleys. After this enumeration, we can divide the sequence of slots into at most h consecutive pieces, each of which is single-peaked. Theorem 2 shows, using similar properties as those in Lemmas 4 and 5, how we can obtain a larger size (polynomial-time) dynamic program similar to dynamic program (3) to solve the problem.
Theorem 2 There is a polynomial algorithm to compute revenue maximization problem in Bayesian settings where the qualities of slots have a constant number of peaks.
Proof Our proof is based on the single peak algorithm. Assume there are h peaks, thus there must be h − 1 valleys. Suppose these valleys are indexed j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j h−1 . In an optimal allocation, for any j k , k = 1, 2, . . . , h − 1, j k must be allocated to a buyer or unassigned to any buyer. If j k is assigned to a buyer, say, buyer i, since i would buy d i consecutive slots, j k may appear in the th position of these d i consecutive slots. Hence, by this brute force, each j k will at most have i d i + 1 ≤ mn + 1 possible positions to be allocated. In all, all the valleys have (mn + 1) h possible allocated positions. For each of this allocation, the slots is broken into h single peak slots. We can obtain similar properties to those in Lemma 4 and 5. 
Note that the dynamic programming runs in polynomial time provided that the number of peaks is constant. Now we consider the case without the constant peak assumption and prove the following hardness result.
Theorem 3 The revenue maximization problem for allocating consecutive ad slots (with unrestricted qualities) to buyers with fixed demands, is NP-hard.
Proof We prove the NP-hardness by reducing from the 3-Partition problem, which is to decide whether a given multi-set of integers can be partitioned into triplets that all have the same sum. More precisely, given a multi-set S of 3n positive integers, can S be partitioned into n triplets S 1 , . . . , S n such that the sum of the numbers in each subset is equal? We use the fact that 3-Partition remains NP-complete in a strong sense in [20] , meaning that it remains NP-complete even when the integers in S are bounded above by a polynomial in n.
Given an instance of 3- Partition (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 3n ) , we construct an instance of the advertising problem with 3n advertisers and m = n + i a i slots. Note that m is polynomial in n due to the fact that all a i are bounded by a polynomial in n. In the advertising instance, the valuation v i for each advertiser i is 1 and his demand d i is defined as a i . Moreover, for any advertiser, his valuation distribution is that v i = 1 with probability 1. Then everyone's virtual value is exactly 1. Maximizing revenue is equivalent to maximizing the simplified function i j∈X i q j .
Let B = i a i /n. We define the quality of slot j to be 0 if j is a multiple of B + 1, otherwise q j = 1. That can be illustrated as follows.
It is not hard to see that the optimal revenue is i a i iff there is a solution to this 3-Partition instance.
Competitive equilibrium
In this section, we study the revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium in the full information setting. To simplify the following discussions, we sort all buyers in non-increasing order of their values, i.e., v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n . (By contrast, in Sect. 3, we sorted them in non-increasing order of virtual values, which are not relevant to competitive equilibrium.) The revenues obtained are compared experimentally in Sect. 7 .
We say that an allocation Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y n ) is efficient if Y maximizes the total social welfare, that is, i j∈Y i v i j is maximized over all the possible allocations. We call p = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m ) an equilibrium price if there exists an allocation X such that (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium. The following lemma is implicitly stated in [23] ; for completeness, we give a proof below.
Lemma 6 If allocation Y is efficient, then for any equilibrium price p, (Y, p) is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof Since p is an equilibrium price, there exists an allocation X such that (X, p) is a competitive equilibrium. As a result, by envy-freeness,
where the first inequality is due to Y being efficient and first equality due to u i (X, p) being competitive equilibrium (unallocated item priced at 0). Therefore, j∈T p j = 0 and the above inequalities are all equalities. ∀i : 
Therefore, (Y, p) is a competitive equilibrium.
By Lemma 6, to find a revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium, we can first find an efficient allocation and then use linear programming to settle the prices. We develop the following dynamic programming to find an efficient allocation. We first only consider there is one peak in the quality order of items. The case with constant peaks is similar to the above approaches, for general peak case, as shown in above Theorem 3, finding one competitive equilibrium is NP-hard if the competitive equilibrium exists, and determining existence of competitive equilibrium is also NP-hard. This is because that considering the instance in the proof of Theorem 3, it is not difficult to see the constructed instance has an equilibrium if and only if 3 partition has a solution.
Recall that all the values are sorted in non-increasing order,
, r ] denotes the maximized value of social welfare when we only consider first s buyers and the allocation of s is exactly the interval [ , r ]. Then we have the following recurrence.
By tracking procedure 5, an efficient allocation denoted by X * = (X * 1 , X * 2 , . . . , X * n ) can be found. The price p * such that (X * , p * ) is a revenue maximization competitive equilibrium can be determined from the following linear programming. Let T i be any consecutive number of d i slots, for all i ∈ [n].
Clearly there is only a polynomial number of constraints. The constraints in the first line represent that all the prices are non negative (no positive transfers). The constraint in the second line means unallocated items must be priced at zero (market clearance condition). And the constraint in the third line contains two aspects of information. First, for any loser k with X k = ∅, the utility that k gets from any consecutive number of d k is no more than zero, which makes all the losers envy-free. The second aspect is that any winner i with X i = ∅ must receive a bundle with d i consecutive slots maximizing its utility over all d i consecutive slots, which together with the constraint in the fourth line (winner's utilities are non negative) guarantees that all winners are envy-free.
Theorem 4 Under the condition of a constant number of peaks in the qualities of slots, there is a polynomial time algorithm to decide whether there exists a competitive equilibrium or not and to compute a revenue maximizing revenue market equilibrium if one does exist. If the number of peaks in the qualities of the slots is unbounded, both the problems are NP-complete.
Proof Clearly the above linear programming and procedure (5) run in polynomial time. If the linear programming output a price p * , then by its constraint conditions, (X * , p * ) must be a competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, if there exist a competitive equilibrium (X, p) then by Lemma 6, (X * , p) is a competitive equilibrium, providing a feasible solution of above linear programming. By the objective of the linear programming, it must be a revenue maximizing one. The NP-hardness follows from Theorem 3.
Theorem 5 The revenue maximization problem for allocating consecutive ad slots to envyfree buyers is NP-hard, even if all slot qualities are the same.
Proof Using similar ideas in the proof of Theorem 3, we prove the NP-hardness by reducing the 3-Partition problem. Given an instance of 3- Partition (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 3n ) . Let B = i a i /n. We construct an instance for advertising problem with 3n + 1 advertisers and m = B + 1 + n + i a i slots. It should be mentioned that m is polynomial of n due to the fact that all a i are bounded by a polynomial of n. In the advertising instance, the valuation v i for each advertiser i is 1 and his demand d i is defined as a i and there is another buyer with valuation 2 for each slot and with demand B + 1. The quality of each slot j is 1. It is not hard to see that the optimal revenue is n B + 2(B + 1) if and only if there is a solution to this 3-Partition instance, the optimal solution is illustrated as follows. The proof of Theorem 6 is based on bundle envy-free solutions; in fact we will prove the bundle envy-free solution is also a consecutive envy-free solution by defining price of items properly. Thus, we first need to give the result on bundle envy-free solutions. Suppose d is the uniform demand for all the buyers. Let T i be the slot set allocated to buyer i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let P i be the total payment of buyer i and p j be the price of slot j. Let t i denote the total qualities obtained by buyer i, t i = j∈T i q j , and
Theorem 7
The revenue maximization problem of bundle envy-freeness is equivalent to solving the following LP.
Proof Recall P i denotes the payment of buyer i, and we next prove that the linear program (6) actually gives an optimal solution of bundle envy-free pricing. By the definition of bundle envy-free, where buyer i would not envy buyer i + 1 and vice versa, we have
By summing up the above two inequalities, we have
Together with t i ≥ t i+1 , the above equation implies (7) and (8) . Furthermore, the maximum payment of n is P n = t n v n . (9) together with t i ≥ t i+1 and P n = t n v n would make everyone bundle envy-free, the arguments are as follows. All the buyers must be bundle envy free. By (9), we have
Noticing that if t i = 0, then P i = 0, which means i is a loser. For any buyer j < i, we have
By rearranging the terms, we have v j t i − P i ≤ v j t j − P j , that means buyer j would not envy buyer i. Similarly,
We have v i t i − P i ≥ v i t j − P j that implies i would not envy buyer j. Now we are ready to calculate n i=1 P i based on (9) and t n+1 = 0.
We know the revenue maximizing problem of bundle envy-freeness can be formalized as (6) .
Since consecutive envy-free solutions are a subset of (sharp) bundle envy-free solutions, hence the optimal value of optimization (6) gives an upper bound of optimal objective value of consecutive envy-free solutions. Note that the optimization LP (6) 
Next, we show how to modify the (sharp) bundle envy-free solution to consecutive envy-free solutions by properly defining the slot price of T i , for all i ∈ [n]. Suppose the optimal winner set of bundle envy-free solution is [L] . Assume the optimal allocation and price of bundle envy-free solution are
Proof of Theorem 6 Define the price of T i iteratively:
. Now we observe that the price defined by the above procedure is still a bundle envy-free solution. This is because by induction, we have
. Hence, we need only to check the prices defined as above and allocations T i constitute a consecutive envy-free solution. In fact, we prove a strong version: suppose T i 's are consecutive from top to bottom in a line S, we will show each buyer i would not envy any consecutive sub line of S comprising d slots. For any i, we consider two cases. Case 1. Buyer i would not envy the slots below his slots. For any consecutive line T below i with size d, suppose T comprises of slots won by buyer k (denoted such slot set by U k ) and k + 1 (denoted such slot set by U k+1 and let = |U k+1 |) where k ≥ i. Recall that t i = j∈T i q j , then
j∈T p j , we get the desired result. Case 2. Buyer i would not envy the slots above his slots. For any consecutive line T above i with size d, suppose T comprises of slots won by buyer k (denoted such slot set by U k ) and k − 1 (denoted such slot set by U k−1 and let
j∈T p j we get the desired result.
Simulation
Since the consecutive model has a direct application for rich media advertisement, the simulation for comparing the schemes: Bayesian optimal mechanism (Bayesian for simplicity in this section), consecutive CE (CE for simplicity in this section), consecutive EF (EF for simplicity in this section), generalized GSP, will be presented in this section. We did a simulation to compare the expected revenue among those pricing schemes. The sampling method is applied to the competitive equilibrium, envy-free solution, Bayesian truthful mechanism, as well as generalized GSP, which is the widely used pricing scheme for text ads in most advertisement platforms nowadays.
The value samples v come from the same uniform distribution U [20, 80] . With a random number generator, we produced 200 group samples {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V 200 }, that are used as the input of our simulation. Each group contains n samples,
k is sampled from the uniform distribution U [20, 80] . For the parameters of slots, we assume there are 6 slots to be sold, and fix their position qualities: 4 , q 5 , q 6 } = {0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3}
The actual ads auction is complicated, and simplified in our simulation. We do not consider richer conditions, such as set all bidders' budgets unlimited, and there are no reserve prices in the mechanisms. We vary the group size n from 5 to 12, and observe their expected revenue variation. From j = 1 through 200, at each j, invoke the function
and Bayesian (V j , D, Q) respectively. Thus, those mechanisms use the same data from the same distribution as inputs and compare their expected revenue fairly. Finally, we average those results from different mechanisms respectively, and compare their expected revenue at sample size n.
The generalized GSP mechanism for rich ads in the simulation was not introduced in the previous sections. Here, in our simulation, it is a simple generalization of the standard GSP which is used in keywords auction. In our generalization of GSP, the allocations of bidders are given by maximizing the total social welfare, which is compatible with GSP in keywords auction, and each winner's price per quality is given by the next highest bidder's bid per quality. Since the real generalization of GSP for rich ads is unknown and the generalization form may be various, our generalization of GSP for rich ads may not be a revenue maximizing one, however, it is a natural one.
Incentive analysis is also considered in our simulation, except Bayesian mechanism (it is truthful bidding, b i = v i ). Since the bidding strategies in other mechanisms (GSP, CE, EF) are unclear, we present a simple bidding strategy for bidders to converge to an equilibrium. We try to find the equilibrium bids by searching the bidder's possible bids (b i < v i ) one by one, from top rank bidders to lower rank bidders iteratively, until reaching an equilibrium where no one would like to change his bid. If any equilibrium exists, we count the expected revenue for this sample; if not, we ignore this sample. Since the Envy-Free solution in our paper only works for the condition that all the bidders have the same demand, thus, we did the simulation in two separate ways:
1. Simulation I is for bidders with fixed demands, d i = 2 for all i, and compares expected revenues obtained by GSP, CE, EF, Bayesian. 2. Simulation II is for bidders with different demands and compares expected revenues obtained by GSP, CE, Bayesian. Figure 3 shows I's results when all bidders' demand fixed at 2. Obviously, the expected revenue is increasing when more bidders involved. When the bidders' number rises, the rank of expected revenue of different mechanisms remains the same in the order Bayesian > EF > CE > GSP.
Simulation II is for bidders with various demands. With loss of generality, we assume that bidder's demand D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d i }, d i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we assign those bidders' demand randomly, with equal probability. Figure 4 shows our simulation results for II when bidders' demand varies in {1,2,3}, the rank of expected revenue of different mechanisms remains the same as simulation I, From this chart, we can see that Bayesian truthful mechanism and competitive equilibrium get more revenues than generalized GSP.
Conclusion
The rich media pricing models for consecutive demand buyers in the context of Bayesian truthfulness, competitive equilibrium and envy-free solution paradigm are investigated in this paper. As a result, an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism is proposed for various settings such as single peak and multiple peaks. In addition, to incorporate fairness e.g. envy-freeness, we also present a polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether or not there exists a competitive equilibrium and to compute a revenue maximized market equilibrium if one does exist. For envy-free settings, though the revenue maximization of general demand case is shown to be NP-hard, we still provide optimal solution of common demand case. Besides, our simulation shows a reasonable relationship of revenues among these schemes plus a generalized GSP for rich media ads.
Even though our main motivation arises from the rich media advert pricing problem, our models have other potential applications. For example TV ads can also be modeled under our consecutive demand adverts where inventories of a commercial break are usually divided into slots of fixed sizes, and slots have various qualities measuring their expected number of viewers and corresponding attractiveness. With an extra effort to explore the periodicity of TV ads, we can extend our multiple peak model to one involved with cyclic multiple peaks.
Besides single consecutive demand where each buyer only have one demand choice, the buyer may have more options to display his ads, for example select a large picture or a small one to display them. Our dynamic programming algorithm (3) can also be applied to this case (the transition function in each step selects maximum value from 2k + 1 possible values, where k is the number of choices of the buyer).
Another reasonable extension of our model would be to add budget constraints for buyers, i.e., each buyer cannot afford the payment that is more than his budget. By relaxing the requirement of Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) to one of approximate BIC, this extension can be obtained by the recent milestone work of Cai et al. [9] . It remains an open problem how to do it under the exact BIC requirement. It would also be interesting to handle it under the market equilibrium paradigm for our model.
